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Abstract 
 
Before enlargement, many experts expected that the functioning of 
most EU institutions would be severely affected by the accession of 
the ten new member states in 2004. Compared to these expectations, 
effects that actually occurred were relatively moderate. Especially 
in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, enlargement took 
place smoothly and without major disturbances. However, some 
changes are noticeable. The paper analyses the way how 
enlargement influenced the functioning of Coreper. The analysis  is 
based on 41 qualitative interviews with experts from the Council 
General Secretariat and from Permanent Representations from both 
‘old’ and ‘new’ member states.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On 1 May 2004, eight central and eastern European countries, along 
with Malta and Cyprus, joined the European Union (EU). The 
biggest enlargement to date, the process of integrating the new 
member states challenged the functionality of the EU’s institutions. 
Large-scale changes were expected to occur within the different 
types of committees whose total number of representatives would 
increase by one third, especially within the Council of the EU and 
its preparatory bodies: the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(Coreper) in its two manifestations, and the Council working groups. 
Several years before enlargement took place, it was feared that the 
candid atmosphere which has repeatedly been identified as the 
conditio sine qua non for the smooth running of the decision-
making process, as well as the feeling of mutual responsibility and 
the commitment to a higher—European—goal would be lost 
through the enlargement and its subsequent greater cultural and 
linguistic diversity. Indeed, Jeffrey Lewis asked in 2002,  
 
‘Will Coreper continue to function the same in an EU of twenty-seven or 
more? … Some believe [it] will lose its ability to synthesize the national 
and the European in such an unwieldy and heterogeneous grouping… 
Much will depend on how quickly and extensively new EU members 
become socialized to Coreper’s normative environment.’ (Lewis 2002: 
295)  
 
Because of this belief, the existing structure of the Union was 
universally perceived to be incapable of integrating the ten—or 
twelve—eastern, central, and southern European candidate 
countries. Most scholars accepted the view, that the size of a group 
makes a difference and that ‘the smaller the circle of participants 
the better.‘
1 Experts agreed that in order to facilitate the transition, 
fundamental reforms would need to be introduced. According to the 
German Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, Joschka Fischer, 
reform was necessary to create the institutional preconditions for 
enlargement (‘Frankfurter Rundschau’, 1 December 2000). 
International media also confirmed the perception that without 
                                                 
1 Puetter 2006: 24. See for Georg Simmels argument on groups size Simmel 1902 
and Simmel 1908.  Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   33 
changes in the voting weights of governments and the extent of 
majority voting, the decision-making machinery designed for the 
six founder members back in 1957 will collapse. Consequently, 
during the period prior to the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice 
in 2000, representatives from EU member and candidate countries, 
political scientists, and the public debate pointed to extensive and 
profound changes in the institutions, decision-making processes, 
and even some of the guiding principles of the EU as the 
prerequisites for enlargement. The result was the signing of the 
Treaty of Nice on 8 December 2000. Only days later, however, the 
perception arose that Nice had been a failure, and that the Union 
was not yet fit for enlargement. Indeed, the then-president of the 
European Commission, Romani Prodi, feared that enlargement 
based on the Treaty of Nice would result in more frequent 
blockades in the Council (‘Süddeutsche Zeitung’, 13 December 
2000), and most commentators agreed that ‘rejoicing over securing 
enlargement … would be premature’ (‘Economist’, 11 December 
2000). The final expectation was that the functioning of most EU 
institutions—but especially the Council—would be severely 
affected by the accession of the ten new member states in 2004. 
Despite the uncertainty of its ability to succeed, enlargement did 
proceed as outlined in the Treaty of Nice, and the EU has been 
functioning with 25 member states for more than two years now.  
 
Although there is a considerable amount of literature on the Council 
in general (Westlake 2004; Hayes-Renshaw/ Wallace 2006; 
Sherrington 2000; Lempp 2005; for the Council General Secretariat 
see Egger 1994) and on Coreper (Bostock 2002; Lewis 1998; De 
Zwaan 1995; Mentler 1996; Noel 1967), a comprehensive or 
theory-based  study on the effects of enlargement on formal and 
informal processes in Coreper is still missing (for general studies on 
Treaty reform within the EU see the Special Issue of the Journal of 
European Public Policy 9 (1), 2002). Theoretic assumptions and 
hypotheses could be drawn from research on epistemic communities, 
on deliberative modes of decision-making within the Council 
structure (Risse 2000), and – in a broader sense – from sociological 
and historical institutionalism, or other approaches that emphasize 34  European Political Economy Review  
   
the possibility of the emergence of common loyalties,
2 as well as 
from public policy analysis (Bennett/ Howlett 1992; Jenkins-Smith/ 
Sabatier 1993; also Puetter 2006: 23f). Without repeating the 
arguments of these theoretic approaches in detail a number of 
questions will be derived from them that will help to structure the 
following paper. The general and underlying question is: how did 
enlargement affect the functioning of Coreper? The purpose of this 
article is then to answer a set of related questions: How did the new 
member states prepare for entrance and how did the EU itself 
prepare for enlargement? Are there any recognizable differences 
between old member states and new member states? Have any new 
cleavages arisen? How do civil servants of old member states 
perceive the civil servants of new member states? Do the new civil 
servants feel well integrated into Coreper and the Council working 
groups? Has Coreper been able to preserve the esprit de corps for 
which it is known? Finally, the article intends to develop a 
provisional evaluation of the efficiency and the functional capability 
of the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU with 25 members. 
The subsequent sections will review these issues in detail. 
The focus of the discussion lies on the perceptions of the 
representatives themselves. The conclusions of this article are 
drawn from 35 semi-structured, intensive, face-to-face interviews 
and six e-mail interviews with members from Permanent 
Representations of 15 member states, with members of the General 
Secretariat of the Council who regularly take part in Coreper or in 
Council working group sessions, and with officials from national 
ministries responsible for coordinating the instructions sent to the 
Permanent Representations.
3  
 
                                                 
2 See Thelen 2004: 295; Christiansen 2001: 25; Wallace 2002: 328; Lewis 1998: 
7; Beyers 1998: 3; Hayes-Renshaw/ Lequesne/ Mayor-Lopez 1989; Pag 1987. 
The same view has already been expressed by Walter Hallstein, who saw ’a great 
deal of psychological integration’ in Coreper (1969: 66). See for integrative 
effects of the committees on the Union as a whole the concepts developed by 
sociological institutionalists like Lewis 2000; 1998; for the concept of committee 
governance and its effects see Christiansen/ Kirchner 2000. 
3 The interview transcripts are used anonymously, in the following text, interview 
transcripts are therefore simply given numbers. The sample of interviewees has 
been selected on the basis of the principles of ‘theoretic sampling’. For the 
analysis of the collected interview data, MaxQDA has been used. The 
interviewees came from six new and from nine old EU member states. Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   35 
 
2.  Preparing for Enlargement  
 
Before the ten candidate countries officially joined the EU in May 
2004 they underwent intensive preparation. The core element of the 
one-year process was their ‘active observer status’ in all European 
institutions. In this way representatives of candidate states were 
actively involved in all negotiations within the Council, Coreper 
and the working groups. Moreover, although the observers did not 
have the right to vote they were able to influence negotiations by 
participating in discussions, delivering persuasive statements, and 
even alluding to future voting behaviour. In addition to providing 
for active observer status, the Council itself and the (future) 
member states prepared for enlargement in several other ways. The 
General Secretariat of the Council invited new member states to 
special trainings and preparatory seminars, and it provided them 
with practical literature (so-called ‘guidebooks’). Furthermore, 
candidate states themselves initiated bilateral contacts with existing 
member states to receive guidance on the functioning of the 
relationship between the Permanent Representation in Brussels and 
those coordinating instructions from the capital proper. For example, 
a representative of the Latvian Permanent Representation said,  
 
‘before enlargement, there were many informal meetings between Latvia 
and Sweden… Latvia copied the structure Sweden uses to coordinate its 
instructions to its representative in Brussels, [and] this was a big 
success.’ (int. 26, 107-108)  
 
Other interviewees reported similar bilateral talks between 
candidate countries and member states, especially between 
countries with similar population sizes (int. 40). This dynamic in the 
learning process affected new member states positively in two ways. 
First, new member states were able to acquaint themselves with and 
to take part in the formal and informal processes, structures, and 
functioning behaviours of the Council. Second, they were able to 
establish and put into practice the complicated patterns of 
interaction between the Brussels-based Permanent Representations 
and the government administrations in the capitals.  
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3.  Cleavages between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ in Coreper 
 
Despite this seemingly thorough preparation for accession, new 
members have emphasized that integration into the EU bodies has 
not been an easy experience for many civil servants. Although there 
are no general patterns of separation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
member states several more subtle cleavages can be identified. For 
example, the necessity to continually give  national interests low 
priority was at first very difficult for many new members. That ‘the 
argument, ‘this is important for my country’ does not count’ (int. 26, 
34-35) reminded many of the negotiators of the Soviet Union’s 
control during the Cold War. Some new members have been facing 
criticism from the popular press in their home countries that what 
used to be Moscow is now Brussels and that national sovereignty is 
handed away too easily. In this regard, some representatives of old 
member states have a different vision ‘of what Europe really is.’ A 
Spanish official said:  
 
‘New member states have a much more intergovernmental vision with 
less acceptance of supranational moves forward; they fight for small 
things as if they … concern[ed] their sovereignty. That makes it difficult 
to handle them.’ (int. 32, 15-16)  
 
It must be noted, however, that this difference in the perception of 
the finalité and guiding principles of the EU in relation to national 
governments not only divides new from old but also raises 
questions within the groups of old and new member states.
4 The 
closer investigation of other cleavages revealed conflicts between 
supporters of protectionism and those of free-trade, between net-
payers and net-receiver countries, and, between states with large 
agricultural sectors and those without. In the latter two cases, new 
member states often find themselves on the same side of the 
                                                 
4 In principle, indicators for measuring other such cleavages are problematic. A 
quantitative investigation of the voting results in the Council aiming at finding 
one more conflict lines faced several problems. First, only the results of votes that 
have finally been passed into a legal act are published. Second, the results give no 
insight into the course of the discussion that proceeded, and the culture of 
consensus and non-isolation of single delegations distort a view on how positions 
might differ systematically. Consequently, probably the best way to explore the 
possibility of persistent cleavages is through qualitative interviews with the 
representatives themselves, as it is done in this paper.  Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   37 
conflict; however, no systematic line of division between new and 
old member states can be drawn (Hayes-Renshaw et. al. 2006). In 
the field of structural and financial policies cleavages exist but not 
purely between new and old member states. Rather, the division is 
between old member states that had net-receiver country status 
before enlargement took place and want to protect their share of EU 
funds and new member states (who are also net-receivers). Old net-
payer countries, however, tend to support new net-receiver 
countries (int. 40, 10-11). The discussion has also been affected by 
the fact that some old net-receiver countries have become net-payer 
countries. France, for example, was a net-receiver country before 
the enlargement. Now, it is a net-payer and promotes the interests of 
a paying nation. In the next financial period Spain might also 
become a net-payer. Of course there are some similarities among 
the newcomers in terms of mutual historical experiences, cultural 
and linguistic relations (see int. 40, 30-32) but this does not 
necessarily lead to bloc-building or formal arrangements among 
those countries. One interviewee admitted that certain arrangements 
exist in the field of foreign politics: 
 
‘some new member states feel a certain closeness to the United States 
due to their experience of independence after 1990. That leads to capitals 
forcing their representatives into instructions which do not really fit in 
here. We call those member states ‘the voice of America’. ’ (int. 10, 69-
70)  
 
Similar situations can also sometimes be found in structural and 
financial policies, but except for these nuanced trade-offs in certain 
policy fields, the overarching trend appears to be mainly shifting 
coalitions and topic-oriented ad-hoc-coalitions. Tactical 
coordination among new member states to increase their 
assertiveness or among old member states does not, in general, take 
place. The final observation is the very fact that new members have 
only been participating for the last two years. ‘New member states 
have not trained the same techniques that we have practiced for 40 
years’ (int. 32, 16-17). The tautological fact that new members are 
new is so dominant because ‘in Coreper, experience and 
institutional memory count a lot’, as stressed by the ambassador of a 
new member state. He continued by summarizing the trouble all 
new member states are collectively facing: 38  European Political Economy Review  
   
 
‘lack of experience, not enough people in the institutions, not that well 
developed links to the inner corridors of the institutions, administrative 
capacity complications, and the fact that we are actually starting in new 
positions everywhere – in our countries, in the regions, in New York 
(UN, WTO) and Vienna (UN, OCSE, IAEA).’ (int. 16, 9-10)  
 
 
4.   Changes in Voting-Behavior 
 
Within Coreper itself, actual voting occurs very rarely. However, 
the often quoted ‘shadow of the vote’ lies upon every QMV-dossier, 
i.e. every dossier that can be decided with a qualified majority of 
votes in the Council. Hence, the possibility of voting in the Council 
changes the way how Coreper and the Council working parties treat 
a particular dossier. Contrary to expectations new member states 
have not caused a blockade of the Council.
5 Moreover, the feared 
voting-chaos has not emerged (int. 2, 33-35). Although the number 
of pieces of legislation passed by the Council sank from an average 
of 93 legal acts per presidency in the years between 1999 and 2003 
to an average of 69 per residency after enlargement,
6  all 
interviewees universally reported that this was due not to 
enlargement but rather to an altered policy of the Commission to 
introduce fewer initiatives to the Council in order to avoid over-
regulation. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that after the May 2004 enlargement 
voting in the Council has become more divisive. Even though only 
29% of the legislation passed by the Council formally requires a 
unanimous vote, about 90% is passed as such (2004: 89.1%; 2005: 
90.2%). Consequently, the hypothesis that the new members would 
cause more dissent within the Council can clearly be disproved for 
the years 2004 and 2005. In addition, the percentage of legislation 
passed with abstention votes for 2004 and 2005 (8.3% and 9.8% of 
all acts, respectively) was also lower than that before enlargement. 
                                                 
5 Deadlock, blockade or at least major problems with decision-making procedures 
in the Council have been predicted by many of scholars and practitioners; see e.g.  
Hayes-Renshaw/ Wallace 2003: 8. See for a comprehensive analysis of the 
voting-behavior within the Council before and after enlargement Hayes-Renshaw 
et al. 2006. 
6 These figures are based on the Monthly Summaries of Council Acts, which are 
publicly available; see also Figure 2 in this paper. Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   39 
Legislation passed with both abstention and dissenting votes from 
2001 to 2003 was more than 16%; this figure was clearly under 
16% in the last two years (see Figure 1). Obviously the often cited 
‘consensus reflex’ is still working in the Council (Hayes-Renshaw 
et al 2006: 183). To date, only ten times a new member state has 
voted against a decision that was passed.
7  In truth, criticism of 
voting behavior of the new member states could actually be directed 
toward that of old member states shortly before the enlargement. 
Statistics show that a striking amount of legislation was passed right 
before enlargement took place - assumingly because the decisions 
would have been harder to take once the new members were 
admitted. Between 1999 and 2005, the month of April shows the 
Council passing an average of 13 pieces of legislation. In April 
2004—the month before enlargement—it passed 63—significantly 
more legislation than in any single month from 1999 on. By contrast, 
the month of May from 1999 to 2005 shows the Council passing an 
average of 18 pieces of legislation, and in May 2004—the month 
the new members arrived—only one (see Figure 2). New members 
could not help but notice this as they had had observer status 
leading up to their entrance. The Antici of a new member state 
expressed it this way: ‘Implicitly, a certain stigmatization can still 
be felt. For example, old Member states made arrangements before 
the enlargement that can hardly be changed now’ (int. 40, 30-32).   
 
                                                 
7 Until the summer of 2006 Lithuania has voted four times against a Council act, 
Malta three times, Poland twice, and the Czech Republic once. Six of the new 
member states have never voted against a decision that was passed; data for 
summer 2006. 40  European Political Economy Review  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Council Acts with votes against and abstentions; the 
line in 2004 symbolizes the accession of the 12 new Member States; Source: 
Monthly Summaries of Council Legal Acts.
Figure 2: Council Acts passed between January 2003 and December 2005; 
Source: Monthly Summaries of Council Legal Acts. Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   41 
 
5.   Changes in the Formal Decision-making Procedures in 
Coreper 
 
Officials from old member states confirmed that the meetings in 
Coreper and Council working groups have changed considerably. 
Meetings have become more difficult, more complex and more 
time-consuming. Indeed, ‘there is more work to do now’ as a 
representative from the Finnish Permanent Representation put it. 
The task of the individual negotiator especially has become more 
difficult because ‘you can no longer rely on clear coalitions’ (int. 17, 
41-42). Achieving either a majority or a blocking minority is more 
cumbersome and more labour-intensive simply because more 
delegations need to be convinced. Moreover, defining the ‘common 
interest’ in a more heterogeneous committee is more complicated. 
‘One can say that the common denominator has become smaller. 
This is logical because the overall disparity has increased’ (int. 17, 
41-42). Besides these more general changes, the pure fact that the 
meetings are now held with around 60 people (in comparison with 
around 40 people before enlargement) has required several practical 
changes. They can be divided into changes of the applied time 
management,  the Council’s language arrangements,  the number of 
delegates as a direct result of enlargement, and a more frequent use 
of the A-point procedure. 
 
All of those interviewed agreed that both Council working group 
and Coreper sessions tend to last longer than before enlargement. 
To avoid a work capacity overload, a series of procedural changes 
have been introduced and, in most groups, truly implemented. For 
example, there is a stricter limitation on negotiators’ speaking time, 
and the usage of the lead speaker method—where member states 
with similar positions on a particular dossier appoint only one 
speaker for the group—is more common. Complete table rounds in 
which every delegate states their position have become rarer. In 
some working groups they do no longer exist at all.  
 
Through enlargement the language problem of the Council and its 
preparatory bodies has intensified. A comprehensive system of 
translations for 20 official languages without indirect translations is 
no longer possible. Even with translations through a third language 42  European Political Economy Review  
   
there are still 38 necessary translations. Coreper has not been 
affected by this problem because of its three-language policy. 
However, in several Council working groups the problem is 
apparent. This is especially the case in groups with capital-based 
representatives, and in the Council itself, whose meetings normally 
only discuss dossiers which have been translated into each official 
language. One member of the Council Secretariat—which is 
responsible for both oral interpretation and written translations—
reported that  
 
‘there is quite a big problem with Maltese, which has too few translators. 
For the Maltese representatives, we have a special arrangement that only 
regulations have to be translated into Maltese immediately. It does not 
always work, however. We had the case that the Parliament did not 
translate a change request into Maltese. Consequently, Malta refused to 
accept the legal act.’ (int. 22, 17-18)  
 
Due to the lack of room-capacity in the Justus-Lipsius-Building the 
last round of enlargement has led to the implementation of stricter 
rules on the number of participants from each delegation in the 
meetings. One civil servant from the German Permanent 
Representation reported,  
 
‘it is much more packed in the room. That means that each delegation, 
even those who might have had numerous representatives before – and 
that applies particularly to Germany – is being represented by a fewer 
number of delegates in the meeting room now.’ (int. 8, 35-36) 
 
Since it is much more difficult to enforce restrictions on speaking-
time at the level of negotiations between Ministers than at the level 
of Coreper and the working groups, the organizational and 
procedural problems described above occur even more frequently in 
the Council. In order to avoid efficiency losses the A-point-
procedure seems to be used even more. It is difficult, however, to 
quantify the number of dossiers passed using the A-point-procedure 
due to the so-called ‘false A’ and ‘false B-points’ (Westlake 2004: 
38). Nevertheless, representatives in the Council Secretariat and in Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   43 
the Permanent Representations all reported an increase in the usage 
of the A-point-procedure even on important issues.
8 
 
All of these practical changes in the formal processes of negotiation 
have resulted in a formalization of the way sessions are run.
9 
General political debates and discussions on topics not on the 
agenda occur less often. Complete table rounds—when they do take 
place—are held according to a stricter timetable. Formal, written 
procedures have gained weight and there is a greater need for the 
presidency to lead sessions efficiently. Consequently, it is not clear 
to every negotiator which delegation defends which position, what 
motivations it has to do so, and what domestic pressure it is under. 
The Antici of a new member state described this tendency towards 
formalization of Coreper and Council working group sessions as an 
‘OSCE-ization of the Council.’ 
 
 
6.  Informal Effects of Enlargement on the Functioning of 
Coreper
10  
 
Partly – and paradoxically – as a consequence of these formal 
changes we can distinguish three inter-related effects enlargement 
has had on the functioning of Coreper. Firstly, important 
negotiations have been shifted from official meetings to more 
informal settings. Secondly, supranational and quasi-supranational 
actors—namely the Commission, the Presidency and the General 
Secretariat of the Council—have gained more influence in the 
Council in that when new member states are not directly concerned 
with an issue, they tend to accept the position held by the majority 
of delegations or that held by the Commission. Finally, a moderate 
weakening of Coreper’s notorious esprit de corps can be observed. 
However, this may only be a temporary phenomenon caused by the 
simple fact that almost half of its members are relatively new to this 
                                                 
8 See e.g. int. 36 and 4. Data is available only for certain periods. Hayes-Renshaw 
counts 411 decisions adopted as A-points in the Council and 215 as B-points in 
the last three months of the year 2004 (2006: 183). 
9   However, Puetter points out to the fact, that in some areas, a certain 
informalization of regular sessions or even the creation of new informal working 
methods as a result of enlargement could be observed (Puetter 2006). 
10 For a comprehensive conceptualization of ‘informality’ see Puetter 2006: 9-35. 44  European Political Economy Review  
   
body. All of these effects will be discussed in more detail in the 
following part of the article. 
 
Along with the above mentioned formalization of Coreper and 
working group sessions goes a second process, which at first glance 
appears quite antithetical: a great deal of substantial negotiations 
have shifted to the ‘couloirs’ (hallways), to telephone calls, and to 
informal meetings outside the Justus-Lipsius-Building. What does 
not fit into the corset of the tight, official meeting schedule, what 
escapes the formal debates, wanders more and more into semi-
formal settings before, between, and after official sessions. The 
good relationships between representatives, and most importantly 
between the Anticis, help in this respect. Even ‘negotiations of 
substantial matters are being back-shifted to lobbies, chambers, and 
the capitals’ (int. 21, 30-31), according to a German civil servant in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In short, while enlargement has 
contributed to a formalization of the official meetings, it has also 
contributed to an informalization of the decision-making process as 
a whole. 
 
While the staffs in the Permanent Representations of the new 
member states quickly and efficiently became familiarized with the 
methods and processes of the Union, this was not always the case 
for the staff involved in the respective capitals. As a result, three 
interrelated consequences have been observed: the Brussels-based 
Permanent Representations and the administrations in the capitals 
do not always work together as a good team; negotiators are 
sometimes still receiving vague or inappropriate instructions, and 
representatives from new member states often cannot promote any 
position on a certain dossier or a specific question. In such cases, 
the delegation typically follows the position of the Presidency, the 
Commission or of the majority. In other cases, there has been a 
change from Permanent Representations merely following the 
instructions outlined by their capitals to Permanent Representations 
actually convincing their capitals of the agreements reached in 
Coreper. While the old member states have had the chance to fine-
tune the interaction between Brussels and their capitals over 
decades, to continually adjust, and to save ‘best practices’ in their 
institutional memory, the structures of new member states had to be 
built and implemented within a very short time. It is not surprising, Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   45 
therefore, that officials from new member states’ representations 
have observed that ‘of course capitals of old member states better 
understand the needs of their Brussels representatives’ (int. 34, 3-4). 
Civil servants who directly interact with EU institutions have 
undergone an intense process of adaptation and learning, whereas 
the ministries of the capitals have not. Only through their presence 
in Brussels already could representatives get a feel for common 
interests, acceptable compromises, and efficient procedures, which 
seem to be still somewhat unfamiliar to the civil servants back 
home. New member states’ administrations are not yet well-
rehearsed in the practices of each.
11 An official from the Austrian 
Permanent Representation said,  
 
‘I have the feeling that they [the new member states] still have too few 
people who are able to deal with European issues. Partly, they get strung 
out when they see what an intensity of consultation we have here.’ (int. 2, 
10-12) 
 
This deficit in the capitals learning often results in members of 
Coreper or working groups from new member states having either 
imprecise or no instructions at all (int. 26). Many interviewees 
observed new member states’ uncertainty on how to deal with 
instructions. As old member states’ representatives are more 
experienced, they are more confident in handling instructions from 
their capitals. In contrast, if specific issues are perceived as 
especially important new members tend to abide by the positions 
listed in their instructions very closely, even when they are 
imprecise or inappropriate. In other cases, representatives from new 
member states often defer to the position recommended by the 
Presidency or the General Secretariat. The Deputy Permanent 
Representative of an old member state said,  
 
‘they are still working on [the coordination at home], and they tell me 
sometimes that they don’t have instructions. This is simply because it is 
                                                 
11 This corresponds with the assumption made by Stacey and Rittberger, that ‘if 
member state principals delegate authority to their own representatives at the 
supranational level (i.e. the Council’s Secretariat and Working Groups), these 
representatives may create internal rules that – for efficiency and other 
motivations – may diverge from the principals’ intentions’ with the effect, that  
new informal rules … militate in favour of small transfers of sovereignty.’   
(2003: 876) 46  European Political Economy Review  
   
quite a task and requires a lot of administrative resources to keep up with 
the pace of what is going on here in Brussels. I think that their 
instructions are not always in all cases fully operational.’ (int. 1, 20-22)  
 
In turn, it becomes somewhat problematic for new member states to 
react ‘on the spot’ to changes during negotiations. As we have said, 
new member states—especially the small and very small ones—
tend to align themselves with the position of the Presidency or the 
majority of states as long as the topic does not specifically concern 
their national interest.
12  The tendency to accept a recommended 
position has caused substantial institutional change. Due to 
enlargement, the proportion of small and very small member states 
has significantly risen. As a result, when new member states are 
lacking a clearly formulated national position and merely follow the 
proposal of the Commission or the compromise suggested by the 
presidency, such initiatives have a higher chance of reaching a 
qualified majority than they would have had before enlargement. In 
this way, the presidency and the Commission have undoubtedly 
been strengthened within the Council’s institutional architecture. 
Correspondingly, the single member has clearly been weakened. 
Although the practiced culture of compromise and consensus in 
working groups and Coreper decreases the power of this mechanism, 
it still gives the supranational and ‘quasi-supranational’ actors an 
option to apply pressure – which, again, constitutes a major 
institutional change. Although new member states take the floor less 
often when not directly affected by an issue, many interviewees 
stated that when important national interests are involved, new 
member states tend to argue their position more fervently and 
sometimes less diplomatically. On the other hand, this too has 
changed. The practice of only promoting one’s own national interest 
                                                 
12 Indeed, a German representative in a working group, for example, observed 
that there are many delegations, especially those from new member states, who 
are more involved in the discussion when the topic is of specific or outstanding 
importance to their country, or when they are more clearly bound to specific 
instructions from their capitals (int. 20, 13-14). Otherwise, old member states 
generally each take the floor once per item on the agenda, while new member 
states intervene perhaps only once per session (see Int. 33). Another German civil 
servant who often works in Council working parties confirmed this observation, 
adding, however, that Polish negotiators actually ‘appear very self-confident.’ (int. 
21, 34-34) Lempp: “Coreper enlarged”   47 
and trying to convince Coreper and working groups of the 
corresponding position is used less often.
13 Right after enlargement,  
 
‘the new member states attempted to sell their capitals’ instructions to 
other member states while the old ones tended more often to end up 
trying to sell the consensus that emerged from Coreper [back] to their 
capitals.’ (int. 34, 7-9)  
 
Today, most representatives from new member states have come to 
the position that the  
 
‘real diplomatic challenge is not to convince your partners about your 
position but to convince your capital about other countries’ positions in 
the interest of a compromise.’ (int. 39, 4-5) 
 
Most researchers find a culture of cooperation, intimacy and trust – 
the often mentioned esprit de corps – a characteristic feature of 
Coreper. And most researchers agree, that it is this specific 
atmosphere that helps Coreper to reach consensus.
14 However, the 
fear that enlargement would lead to the corrosion of esprit de corps 
and that this would lead to an increased probability of conflict and 
deadlock proved unfounded. For the most part, Coreper and those 
working groups that are composed of representatives from the 
Permanent Representations have continued to be described as 
cooperative and friendly:  
 
‘There is still a lot of esprit de corps in Coreper. And the reason for this 
is that we know each other quite well, meeting regularly in the meeting 
room and sometimes in more unofficial circumstances as well. So there 
is some kind of familiarity and closeness, and it helps [in] dealing with 
the matters.’
15  
                                                 
13 Whether this change is lasting cannot be finally evaluated after two years of 
enlargement, of course. 
14 See for the conceptualization of esprit de corps Lewis 2003; 1998; Puetter 
2006; Checkel 2001; Sabatier 1993. See for the specific culture within Coreper as 
a precondition for a deliberative interaction style Puetter 2006; for the 
conceptualization of deliberation within international forums, see Risse 2000.  
15 Int. 30, 31-34; see also int. 5. The Mertens counsellor from an old member state 
stated: ‘They [the new representatives] have stepped into the group of Mertens 
Counsellors very well. But that is also partly due to the big family. You are 
accepted from the beginning on. People come, they are welcomed, they introduce 
themselves, we all directly talk and so you are in immediately. And they have that 48  European Political Economy Review  
   
 
The new members’ representatives also see themselves as well-
integrated into Coreper: ‘We, the newcomers, just took over the 
existing spirit’ (int. 41, 2-3). The intrinsic principle to find 
compromise and even—if possible—consensus between the 
member states has not changed, and new members have quickly 
adapted to this concept. The Antici of a new member stated,  
 
‘that it is possible to find compromise is actually a miracle. This is only 
possible due to the special spirit of the Council, the esprit de corps. You 
feel the necessity to compromise. Unless there are fundamental national 
interests directly and strongly affected, no one accepts a member state’s 
blockade.’ (int. 13, 16-18)  
 
New representatives realized Coreper’s central position in the EU 
very quickly, as reflected in phrases such as ‘heart of the union,’ the 
‘locus where things are decided,’ and ‘very special club.’ Such 
characteristics of Coreper were crucial for a smooth integration of 
the new members. The same counts for other groups within the 
Council as well. The Anticis and their spouses, for example, take a 
trip every six months to the country of the Presidency where, 
according to testimonies of several Anticis, close and amicable 
contacts are established. As stated by a Coreper Coordinator from 
the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘the Anticis are very 
intimate, they can talk very frankly with each other. New member 
states can’t deny this dynamic’ (int. 21, 18). Overall, most officials 
pointed to only a moderate weakening of Coreper’s esprit de corps. 
A new member state’s ambassador confirmed,  
 
‘it is clear that older colleagues know each other better and especially 
know how to use the services of General Secretariat and Commission 
better. It is clear that they consult informally with each other more often 
than with us.’ (int. 16, 5-6)  
 
Nevertheless, this may only be a temporary circumstance, and 
considering that enlargement increased the members of the 
Committee by two thirds, the trustworthy atmosphere of Coreper 
has been maintained surprisingly well. 
 
                                                                                                               
feeling, too. That is why they already get themselves involved quite well.’ (int. 9, 
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7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This article has addressed questions regarding the effects the EU’s 
most recent round of enlargement has had on the working practices 
and the functioning of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
The empirical findings of the paper show that answers to some of 
these questions are quite counterintuitive: Firstly, enlargement did 
at the same time contribute to a formalization of regular Coreper 
sessions and to an informalization of the whole decision-making 
process in the Council. Secondly, it also contributed to a 
strengthening of the supranational and ‘quasi-supranational’
16 actors 
within the Council to an extend that makes it relatively problematic 
to continue to describe the Council as an (purely) 
‘intergovernmental’ body. And thirdly, the new member states’ 
representatives in Coreper and other Council Working Parties did 
extremely well in integrating and adapting to the methods used in 
Brussels, however, the administrations in their capitals did much 
less so. Nevertheless, there is no evidence for deadlock in the 
Council. 
The above evaluation of the past two years shows that the worst 
case scenario, which many feared after Nice, did not occur. The EU 
has not been completely blocked in its decision-making, and no 
insurmountable challenges have emerged. As difficult as the 
enlargement has been in many areas—within the European 
institutions and especially within Coreper—overall, it has been 
perceived by most actors within and around Coreper as a success. 
Obviously the Council is still ‘capable of adapting to many new 
situations over the years, often in innovative ways’ (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2003: 8). A representative from the Danish 
Permanent Representation put it this way:  
 
‘Enlargement took place, and we think less and less in terms of old and 
new member states. This is, of course, a gradual process, but already 
now we see that it is more a question whether you are an old 
representative—in the sense of one who has been around for a long 
time—than whether you are from an old or a new member state. So, if 
                                                 
16 Whereas the Commission can be described as a supranational actor within the 
Council and Coreper, the Presidency and the General Secretariat are better 
described as ‘quasi-supranational’ actors. 50  European Political Economy Review  
   
you are a new representative from an old member state, you may be less 
integrated than if you are an old representative from a new member 
state.’ (int. 1, 41-43)  
 
Other interviewees confirmed that the enlargement—at least from 
the institutional point of view—‘functions surprisingly well’ (int. 36, 
19-20). Indeed, there is even some evidence leading to the 
assumption that because of enlargement, Coreper and the working 
groups were forced to make procedures more efficient. Again and 
again, representatives from old member states emphasized that new 
member states make much effort in making sessions more efficient 
by backing off of topics that do not directly concern them and by 
being ready to accept new and more efficient processes right away 
(see int. 1; 14; 17; 2; 30). The overall situation seems quite well 
caught by the words of a deputy Permanent Representative of an old 
member state:  
 
‘The new member states are not standing on the breaks; however, I do 
not know if they are standing on the accelerator either. The decrease in 
tempo though—which you can see has emerged—from my point of view, 
is not caused by the new member states. There are other reasons for that, 
a number of reasons to the extent that the difficulties of enlargement are 
more due to the ability of old member states to ‘digest’ enlargement. It is 
not the ability of new member states to agree on new measures; it is 
more the old member states’ inability or ‘indigestion’ of enlargement. I 
think time will cure that, but that is the situation right now.’ (int. 1, 45-
48) 
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